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The author, in this article, considers some of the key features 
of the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011), with 
particular reference to the provisions on technical fees, permanent 





On 27 June 2011, the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (2011) 
(the “2011 Treaty”)
1
 was signed. The United Kingdom completed its 
domestic ratification procedures in November 2011,
2
 but, as at the 
time of the writing of this writing, the 2011 Treaty had not yet 
entered into force. In contrast to several other new or revised 
tax treaties that China has signed that await ratification,
3
 
China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is normally 
responsible for the negotiation of tax treaties, has yet to release 
the Chinese version of the 2011 Treaty. The 2011 Treaty’s effective 
date is, therefore, still unknown. 
 
On 27 February 2013, a Protocol amending the 2011 Treaty (the 
                                                             
1. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 June 2011), Treaties IBFD 
[hereinafter: P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011)]. 
2. UK: Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (China) Order 2011 (S. I. 2011/2724), 
available at www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/2724/pdfs/uksi_20112724_en.pdf. 
3. For instance, the tax treaties that China has concluded with Ethiopia (2009), Belgium (2009), Zambia 
(2010), Syria (2010) and Malta (2010), See 
www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8687294/index.html for a list of published Chinese tax 




 was signed  and was immediately announced by 
both governments the next day. The amendment modifies a provision 
in the Dividend article in the 2011 Treaty (further discussed in 
section 4.) that appeared to be unusually favourable to UK investors, 
and was presumably requested by China. This development suggests 
that the parties have had occasion recently to revisit and agree 
their positions. Accordingly, the respective ratifications of the 
2011 Treaty may, at the time of the writing of this article, not 
be too distant. 
 
This article examines select aspects of the 2011 Treaty, which 
constitutes a substantial revision of the existing treaty between 
the two countries, the China-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1984) 
(the “1984 Treaty”).
5
 The  1984 Treaty , signed on 26 July 1984 and 
taking effect for both countries in 1985,
6
 was the fourth 
comprehensive tax treaty concluded by China and, along with the 
China-Japan Income Tax Treaty (1983),
7
 one of the first of China’s 
tax treaties to take effect. It is not the intention of this article 
to comprehensively list of the major changes in the 2011 Treaty 
(what is a “major” change depends, in any case, on the perspective 
adopted).
8
 Instead, this article focuses on several features of the 
2011 Treaty that are unusual with regard to either China or the 
United Kingdom, and sometimes for both countries. Many of these 
features also raise issues of interpretation that apply to many 
                                                             
4.  Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains (27 Feb. 
2013), Treaties IBFD, also available at www.hmrc.gov.uk/taxtreaties/signed/china-uk-protocol.pdf. 
5. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (26 July 1984), Treaties IBFD 
[hereinafter: P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)]. 
6. The P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984) was amended by Protocol Amending the Agreement between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China for the Reciprocal Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (2 Sept. 1996), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: Protocol 
(1996) to the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984)]. 
7. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (6 
Sept. 1983), Treaties IBFD. 
8. Important changes between the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) and the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax 
Treaty (1984) that are not considered in this article include: (1) changes to the Business Profits article to 
acknowledge both the deductibility of arm’s-length expenses (also confirmed through an explicit provision for 
such deductibility in the Non-Discrimination article) and the method of attribution by apportionment; (2) the 
provision for coordinated adjustments, including through competent authority consultation, in determining the 
profits of associated enterprises; (3) the deletion of exemptions for teachers and researchers and the curtailing of 
exemptions for students, with grandfathering for individuals entitled to relevant benefits before the P.R.C.-U.K. 
Income Tax Treaty (2011) takes effect; (4) extending the scope of mutual agreement procedures; (5) the deletion 
of tax sparing provisions in the Elimination of Double Taxation article; and (6) an extensive updating of the 




 In the following four sections, the author 
examines these features, i.e. the now-deleted Technical fees 
article (see section 2.), and the Permanent Establishment (PE) 
article (see section 3.), the passive and other income articles 
(see section 4.) and the anti-avoidance provisions (see section 
5.) of the 2011 Treaty. 
 
2. Technical Fees 
 
The deletion of the Technical fees article in the 2011 Treaty is 
likely to be unsurprising to many readers. A similar article appears 





 Income Tax Treaties, and the United 
Kingdom has abandoned the use of such an article in its recent tax 
treaties. The significance of this article in the 1984 Treaty has 
also diminished over the years due to the application of the PE 
and royalties articles. However, the process by which this has 
happened involves an interesting history of both bilateral 
negotiations and treaty interpretation in China. Some of this 
history is considered here, lest it be (further) buried and 
forgotten following the deletion of the Technical fees article. 
 
Article 13(3) of the 1984 Treaty, before its amendment in the 
Protocol (1996), defined “technical fees” as: 
[PCD single spaced] 
... payments of any kind to any person in consideration for 
any services of a technical, supervisory or consultancy 
nature, including the use of, or the right to use, 
information concerning industrial, commercial or 
scientific experience, but it does not include payments 
made to an employee of the person making the payments for 
dependent personal services mentioned in Article 16. 
 
In the very first domestic guidance on treaty interpretation issued 
by the Chinese government,
12
 the Ministry of Finance announced that 
                                                             
9. See the discussions of the criteria in respect of independent agency (in section 3.), the “special 
relationship” limitation in the Other Income article (in section 4.) and the “purpose of creation or assignment” 
rule (in section 5.). 
10. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's 
Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income (18 July 1994), Treaties IBFD. 
11. Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
respect to Taxes on Income (27 Dec. 1989), Treaties IBFD. 
12. Tax Administration of the Ministry of Finance, Opinion regarding the Treatment of Certain Issues in 
the Implementation of the China-Japan and China-UK Treaties ([85] Caishuiwaizi 042, 26 Mar. 1985). 
4 
supervisory activities related to “a building site or a 
construction, installation or assembly project” should be taxed 
under the Technical fees article and the PE rule in article 5(3) 
of the 1984 Treaty, according to which such a site or project 
constitutes a PE only if lasted for more than six months, did not 
apply.
13
 Presumably, this meant that whether or not supervisory 
activities constituted a PE was not subject to the six-month rule, 
but, rather, to the other provisions of article 5, for example, 
a fixed place PE could exist despite a duration of less than six 
months. This appears to be a literally correct reading of the 1984 
Treaty, given the absence of any reference to supervisory 
activities in article 5 of that tax treaty and the explicit reference 
to such activities in the Technical fees article. There was, however, 
a hidden misunderstanding. In 1990, the SAT released an internal 
circular
14
 stating that the lack of prior negotiating experience 
on China’s part had resulted in divergent interpretations of the 
1984 Treaty and problems regarding its implementation. It was also 
disclosed that, at meetings between the tax authorities of China 
and the United Kingdom held in London between 16 and 19 July 1990, 
the parties had engaged in “pragmatic discussions” and reached 
agreement regarding “a majority of issues”, while further 
discussions were to be had regarding outstanding disagreements. 
One of the several agreed outcomes of the London meeting, was that 
without revising the text of the 1984 Treaty, article 5 would be 
applied to supervisory activities “in specific implementation”.
15
 
If supervisory activities were carried out under a contract that 
included “contractual engineering”
16
 activities, the 
determination of whether or not the activities constituted a PE 
should be made according to the six-month rule in article 5(3). 
If a PE was found to exist, fees for supervisory activities would 
be taxed as business profits, otherwise, the fees were to be taxed 
under the Technical fees article. 
 
A second outcome of the 1990 London consultation concerned yet 
another unintended encroachment of the Technical fees article on 
another article of the 1984 Treaty. Specifically, it was agreed 
that fees for the use of “information concerning industrial, 
                                                             
13. Id, sec. 2(5). 
14. SAT, Notice Regarding the Interpretation of Certain Provisions in the China-UK Tax Treaty 
(Guoshuihanfa [1990]1097, 8 Aug. 1990). 
15. Id, sec. 1(3). 
16. That is “a building site or a construction, installation or assembly project”. For the use of the term 
“contractual engineering” to refer to article 5(3) activities, see SAT, Annotations on the Provisions of the 
Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and of the Protocol thereto, Guoshuifa [2010] 75 (16 July 2010). 
5 
commercial or scientific experience” should be covered by the 
Royalties article (article 12) of the 1984 Treaty, instead of the 
Technical fees article. Which article applied was important, as 
the tax rate on technical fees was set at a maximum of 7%, whereas 
for royalties (other than equipment rentals) the maximum was 10%. 
According to the SAT Circular, the parties agreed that “so as not 
to have to amend the language of the treaty”, both sides would, 
during the “actual implementation” of the 1984 Treaty, interpret 
“information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific 
experience” as a form of proprietary technology. This extraordinary 
tacit understanding was not evidenced by any published instrument 
in the 1984 Treaty. Interestingly, the Protocol (1996) amending 
the 1984 Treaty formalized the solution by transferring the 
language regarding “information concerning industrial, commercial 
or scientific experience” from its unintended place in the 
Technical fees article to the Royalties article.
17
 However, nothing 
was done to codify the understanding that supervisory activities 
in relation to “a building site or a construction, installation 
or assembly project” would be subject to the six-month rule of 
article 5(3). This mutual understanding is now only explicitly 
reflected in the language of the new article 5(3) in the 2011 Treaty. 
 
The 1990 consultation on the Technical fees article also led to 
the first statement by the Chinese tax authorities regarding the 
boundary between technical services and royalties. Even today, 
there is little guidance within the context of Chinese domestic 
law regarding how this difficult distinction is to be drawn. And 
in the context of treaty interpretation, it was not until 2009 that 
the SAT offered substantial guidance.
18
 However, in 1990, the SAT 
was prompted to state, in connection with the 1984 Treaty, that 
technical services did not include services rendered for purposes 
of transferring proprietary technology, which would, rather, be 
covered by the Royalties article, while services provided in 




All of these interpretations reduced the scope of application of 
the Technical fees article. However, there is a more fundamental 
issue affecting the article’s significance that was not resolved 
until 2011. The article deems technical fees to arise in the state 
of the payer, even if services are provided entirely outside that 
                                                             
17. Art. 4 Protocol (1996) to the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984). 
18. Guoshuihan (2009) No. 507 (SAT, 14 Sept. 2009) (Notice on Questions concerning the Implementation 
of the ‘Royalties’ Article under Tax Treaties) 
19. By implication, services provided in connection with software are likely to be covered by the Royalties 
article. See Guoshuihanfa [1990]1097, supra n. 14, at sec. 1(2). 
6 
state. Consequently, if services are provided to a Chinese party 
but are performed entirely outside of China, would the fees be 
taxable? The answer depends, of course, also on Chinese domestic 
law. Before 1991, technical fees not connected with a PE in China 
were explicitly exempt from taxation in China.
20
 After that, Chinese 
domestic income tax law in respect of both enterprises and 
individuals also sourced income for services to the place where 
the services were performed. This meant that income for services 
performed by non-residents outside China would not be taxable under 
Chinese domestic law. Assuming that, as a matter of general 
principle, a tax treaty cannot bestow on a state any taxing power 
that it has not exercised under its domestic law, the Technical 
fees article should not have had the effect of extending China’s 
authority to tax technical services provided outside China. However, 
it was unclear whether or not this general principle applied in 
China. It was only as recently as 2011 that the SAT explicitly 
confirmed that, even if a Technical fees article deemed certain 
fees for services provided outside China to arise within China, 
thereby giving China the right to tax under the tax treaty, Chinese 
domestic rules should be applied and such fees should not be taxed.
21
 
The 2011 guidance only has effect from 16 March 2011 and it is likely 
that Chinese tax agencies had sometimes regarded the Technical fees 
article as giving them a taxing right that they did not have under 
domestic law. 
 
The deletion of the Technical fees article in the 2011 Treaty still 
leaves one question unanswered, i.e. how income that would have 
been classified as technical fees under the 1984 Treaty should be 
taxed under the 2011 Treaty. It should be noted that the SAT has 
already stated elsewhere
22
 that at least some of the services 
classified as generating technical fees would, in the absence of 
a Technical fees article, be classified as business profits. This 
is surely correct in the most common cases, i.e. technical fees 
provided cross-border are rarely not part of the “profit of an 
enterprise”.
23
 On the other hand, it is conceivable that some 
technical fees could not be characterized as business profits. In, 
but only in, such cases, what would have been classified under a 
Technical fees article could fall under the Other Income article, 
                                                             
20. See [85] Caishuiwaizi 042, supra n. 12, at sec. 5(2). 
21. SAT Bulletin [2011] 19, Bulletin Regarding Certain Issues in the Implementation of the Technical Fees 
Article of the China-UK Treaty and Certain Other Bilateral Tax Treaties (16 Mar. 2011). 
22. See Guoshuihan (2009) No. 507, supra n. 18, at sec. 6. 
23. See K. van Raad, Coherence among the OECD Model’s Distributive Rules: the “Other” State and 
Income from Third Countries, in Essays on Tax Treaties: A Tribute to David A. Ward ch. 4 (G. Maisto, A. 
Nikolakakis, and J. Ulmer, eds.,Can. Tax Found. & IBFD 2013). 
7 






The 2011 Treaty amends article 5 of the 1984 Treaty in several 
important aspects. First, a building site, a construction, assembly 
or installation project or connected supervisory activities now 
constitute a PE only if they continue for more than 12 months, as 
opposed to six months. Second, a standard “services PE” clause has 
been added, such that services provided in a state for periods 
aggregating 183 days or more in any 12-month period give rise to 
a PE. These changes are in line with recent treaty practices of 
both China and the United Kingdom, as well as with the OECD Model 
(2010),
25
 in the case of the 12-month-period for construction site 
PEs, and the UN Model (2011),
26
 in the case of service PEs. 
 
A third change to article 5 in the 2011 Treaty, however, introduces 
something new. In article 5(6), which provides that agents of an 
independent status do not create a PE, new wording (shown in italics) 
has been added as to what does not qualify as an independent agent: 
 [PCD single spaced] 
However, when the activities of such an agent are devoted 
wholly or almost wholly on behalf of that enterprise, and 
conditions are made or imposed between that enterprise and 
the agent in their commercial and financial relations which 
differ from those which would have been made between 
independent enterprises, he will not be considered an agent 
of an independent status within the meaning of this 
paragraph. 
 
The italicized text is derived from the revision to article 5(7) 
of the UN Model (2001),
27,28
 but has only infrequently been used by 
China and the United Kingdom in previous tax treaties. With regard 
to for the United Kingdom, it has appeared in the tax treaties 
concluded with Kuwait (1999), Jordan (2001) and Libya (2008) and, 
                                                             
24. The new Other Income article in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) generally allocates taxing 
rights to the resident state, unless the income is connected with a PE in the other contracting state. However, as 
discussed in sections 4. and 5., this treatment is qualified by a beneficial ownership requirement, a “special 
relationship” limitation, and an anti-abuse rule that examines the “purpose of the creation or assignment” of the 
right in respect of which income is paid. 
25. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (22 July 2010), Models IBFD. 
26. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD. 
27. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 2001), Models IBFD. 
28. For a fascinating discussion of the history of the “wholly or almost wholly” provision in article 5(7), 
see R. Vann, The UN Model and Agents: “Wholly or Almost Wholly”, in  Maisto, Nikolakakis & Ulmer eds., 
supra n. 23, at ch. 5. 
8 
with regard to China, it has appeared in the tax treaties concluded 
with Nigeria (2002), Morocco (2002), Azerbaijan (2005) and 
Singapore (2007). Both the language and the rationale for the 
introduction of this revision into the UN Model (2001) are 
problematic, and its interpretation in practice is likely to give 
rise to confusion. 
 
On the face of it, the issue of whether an agent is an independent 
one (or whether it is, instead, dependent on the principal) is 
orthogonal to the issue of whether the agent and principal deal 
on arm’s-length terms. An employee is a paradigm example of a 
dependent agent, but an employee is entirely capable of dealing 
with the employer on arm’s-length terms in the employment 
relationship, for example, compensation, duties and obligations 
can be determined entirely in accordance with market practice. The 
fact that the principal pays the agent market compensation should 
not, therefore, affect the determination of whether or not the agent 
is dependent. In the traditional understanding of what makes an 
agent dependent for purposes of article 5, as is evidenced by the 
Commentary on Article 5(5) of the OECD Model, which is also quoted 
in the Commentary on Article 5(5) of the UN Model, the key issues 
are: (1) whether the agent’s commercial activities for the 
principal are subject to detailed instructions or to comprehensive 
control; (2) whether the entrepreneurial risk of the relevant 
activity is borne by the agent or principal; and (3) whether the 
agent’s activities on behalf of the principal are undertaken in 
the ordinary course of the agent’s business.
29
 The fact that the 
activities of the agent are performed wholly or almost wholly on 
behalf of only one principal is believed to reduce the likelihood 
of independent agency.
30
 Presumably, this is because having only 
one principal increases the likelihood that the agent is subject 
to comprehensive control (criterion (1)) and reduces its capacity 
to bear risk (criterion (2)). The agent would also not have its 
own ordinary course of business among which are that it serves the 
principal (criterion (3)).
31
 Apparently, the presumption of the 
lack of dependence of a “single-principal agent” at one point seemed 
                                                             
29. See of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 5(6) paras. 
38-38.8 (22 July 2010), Models IBFD and UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary 
on Article 5 paras. 30-33 (1 Jan. 2011), Models IBFD. These criteria are incorporated into China’s interpretation 
of the criteria for independent agents for the purposes of article 5. See Guoshifa [2010] 75, supra n. 16, 
annotations on Article 5(6). 
30. But having multiple principals is not itself sufficient to establish independence. See para. 38.6 OECD 
Model: Commentary on Article 5(5) (2010). 
31. Although why this should matter is a question that can be raised regarding the “ordinary course of 
business” test in general. See the discussion the three subsequent paragraphs in this article. 
9 
to be so strong that, in the UN Model (1980)
32
 as well as many tax 
treaties, including the 1984 Treaty, such an agent is explicitly 
stated not to be independent, even though, under the OECD Commentary 
on Article 5, this factor should not be “decisive”. 
 
However, the UN Model (2001) inserted the arm’s-length requirement 
to mitigate the presumption of non-independence in respect of a 
single-principal agent.
33
 The rationale given is, first that it is 
“anomalous ... that if the number of enterprises for which an 
independent agent was working fell to one, the agent would, without 
further examination, be treated as dependent”. In order to address 
this anomaly, it is stated that “the essential criterion for 
automatically treating an agent as not being of ‘an independent 
status’ is the absence of the arm’s-length relationship”. This is 
a puzzling statement. Some might find it persuasive that having 
only one principal may not be conclusive evidence regarding the 
satisfaction of criteria (1) to (3), i.e. control, risk, and 
ordinary course of business, in the preceding paragraph and that 
an irrefutable presumption may result in errors. Nevertheless, it 
is unclear as to how an arm’s-length relationship bears on the three 
traditional criteria for agency independence. Consider, for 
example, the question of whether or not a subsidiary can be an 
independent agent of the parent. The answer is yes
34
 if the same 
criteria, for example, those regarding control, risk and ordinary 
course of business, applying to unrelated enterprises are satisfied. 
However, whether or not the subsidiary’s activities are wholly or 
almost wholly taken on behalf of the parent, it could certainly 
be the case that “conditions [are] imposed ... in their commercial 
and financial relations which differ from those which would have 
been made between independent enterprises”. In other words, it 
appears that a subsidiary may deal with its parent on 
non-arm’s-length terms, for example, by receiving insufficient 
consideration by market standards, and yet still act as an 
independent agent that has control, bears risk and serves other 
principals. Why, then, should the presence of non-arm’s-length 
dealing suddenly become relevant when there is only one (or almost 
only one) principal? 
 
Accordingly, the language in article 5(7) of the UN Model (2001), 
which was introduced into article 5(6) of the 2011 Treaty, arguably 
contains a non-sequitur. The significance of this language lies 
                                                             
32. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (1 Jan. 1980), Models IBFD. 
33. UN Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 5 paras. 32 and 33 (1 
Jan. 2001), Models IBFD. 
34. Para. 38.1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 5 (2010). 
10 
in the fact that it is likely to be read as not just relevant to 
applying the presumption of dependence in the case of a 
single-principal agent, but as also relevant to the determination 
of the nature of independent agency in general. In a rather inchoate 
way, it may give rise to the intuition that arm’s-length dealing 
in itself counts against the characterization of agency as 
dependent. 
 
This intuition could be tempting to resort to in connection with 
certain other anomalies that tax treaties themselves create. 
Consider the situation in which enterprise X of Country B has a 
fixed place of business in Country A , which constitutes a PE of 
enterprise X in Country A. The PE provides various services 
exclusively, for example, consulting and market information, to 
enterprise X’s headquarters in Country B. An affiliate of 
enterprise X, enterprise Y, which is also resident in Country B, 
wishes to avail itself of the services provided by enterprise X, 
and considers the possibility of getting it from enterprise X via 
enterprise X’s PE in Country A. From the perspective of enterprise 
X and enterprise Y, this is a commercially sensible business 
arrangement and enterprise Y may be willing to pay an arm’s-length 
price for the services. But there is a substantial risk that the 
arrangement could give rise to a PE for enterprise Y in Country 
A. The reason for this is that, while enterprise X provides the 
services for itself through the PE in Country A, according to 
standard interpretations of the independent agent exception to PEs
35
 
this is not in the “ordinary course of business” in which X can 
be said to provide the services to others. Accordingly, there is 
a risk that enterprise X could be treated as a dependent agent of 
enterprise Y if it were to provide the services to enterprise Y 
via its PE in Country A. In order to reduce enterprise Y’s PE risk 
from this apparently innocuous arrangement, it may be tempting to 
structure the dealing between enterprise X and enterprise Y on an 
arm’s-length basis, and seek comfort from that. However, the 
anomaly in the case in question really arises because of the 
“ordinary course of business” requirement and has nothing to do 
with non-arm’s-length dealing. In order to see the difference 
between the two issues, it should be noted that country A may require 
enterprise X and enterprise Y to deal on an arm’s-length basis with 
regard to the services provided from Country A for purposes of 
computing the profits attributable to the PE, even if enterprise 
Y is not deemed to have a PE in Country A by virtue of the contract 
                                                             
35. See the example of the commission agent in paragraph 38.7 of the OECD Model: Commentary on 
Article 5 (2010). 
11 
with enterprise X. 
 
Accordingly, by adding the new language on arm’s-length dealings 
to article 5(6) of the 2011 Treaty, both China and the United Kingdom 
may have inadvertently fallen deeper into this conceptual morass. 
 
4. Passive and Other Income 
 
With regard to passive income, the most substantial changes 
effected by the 2011 Treaty relate to dividends and capital gains.
36
 
Specifically, in respect of dividends, the maximum withholding tax 
rate for a greater than 25% shareholders is reduced from 10% to 
5%. In the original version of the 2011 Treaty, The shareholding 
percentage took into account both direct and indirect ownership, 
making this aspect of the 2011 Treaty more favourable to UK 
investors
37
 than similar provisions in China’s other recent tax 
treaties, for example those with Hong Kong (2006), Singapore (2007) 
and Belgium (2009). However, this was modified by the Protocol 
(2013), which restores the shareholding percentage requirement to 
a direct ownership of no less than 25%, consistent with the other 
recent tax treaties. Meanwhile, a specific provision in respect 
of real estate investment trust (REIT) distributions
38
 caps the 
withholding tax rate on REIT distributions at 15%. While this 
appears to be the first time that a provision regarding REITs has 
been included in a Chinese tax treaty, it is not an uncommon 
provision in UK tax treaties. 
 
What is more remarkable is a new paragraph that exempts the 
governments and state-owned entities of both countries from tax 
on dividends received from companies resident in the other country. 
Article 10(3) of the 2011 Treaty states that: 
[PCD single spaced] 
... dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting 
State shall be taxable only in that other Contracting State 
                                                             
36. Professor van Raad drew the author’s attention to the fact that in articles 10(1), the formulation 
“dividends derived by ... a resident of the other Contracting State” in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984) 
has been changed to “dividends paid..to a resident of the other Contracting” in the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax 
Treaty (2011), and that the same changes were made to articles 11(1) and 12(1). While this conforms the 
relevant provisions of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) to the OECD Model, whether it is an 
improvement is open to debate. 
37. The current benefit for Chinese investors in UK companies is limited because of the current UK tax 
exemption for dividends paid by UK companies to foreign shareholders. 
38. Art. 10(2)(b) P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011). Specifically, “an investment vehicle which 
distributes most of [its] income or gains annually and whose income or gains from ... immovable property is 
exempted from tax”. 
12 
if the beneficial owner of the dividend is the Government 
of that other Contracting State or any of its institutions; 
or other entity the capital of which is wholly-owned 
directly or indirectly by the Government of that other 
Contracting State. 
 
As unusual as this provision may appear, it is not new in tax treaties. 
For instance, the China-Saudi Arabia (2006)
39
 and United Arab 
Emirates-Vietnam (2009)
40
 Income and Capital Tax Treaties contained 
identical or similar provisions for dividend exemptions. In a 
larger number of tax treaties, several countries, for example, 
Singapore, have negotiated dividend tax exemptions for governments 
and specific listed state-owned entities. Some countries may take 
the view that there is little policy reason to offer exemptions 
to governments and state-owned entities with regard to one type 
of investment income
41
 but not others, and have negotiated 
treaty-based exemptions for dividend, interest, capital gains
42
 and 
even all income derived by governments and “their institutions”.
43
 
Awareness of (and interest in) this practice may still be limited 
among the OECD member countries, although growing.
44
 Once this 
practice is taken into account, the most surprising aspect of the 
dividend exemption for governments and state-owned entities in the 
2011 Treaty is not its appearance, but, rather, the fact that it 
has been introduced at a time when the United Kingdom exempts 
dividends paid by UK companies to foreign investors. This means 
that the immediate beneficiaries of the new article 10(3) are UK 
government institutions and UK state-owned entities, and not their 
Chinese counterparts, even though the latter are more numerous and 
                                                             
39. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the 
People's Republic of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with 
respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (23 Jan. 2006), Treaties IBFD. 
40. Agreement between the Government of United Arab Emirates and the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income and on Capital (16 Feb. 2009), Treaties IBFD. 
41. There is a well-known and long-standing practice in tax treaties of providing a tax exemption for 
interest on loans where either the borrower or the lender is a contracting state’s government. 
42. See, for example, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the State of 
Kuwait for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital art. 21 (28 Jan. 2002), Treaties IBFD. 
43. See Convention between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect 
to Taxes on Income (27 Aug. 1991), Treaties IBFD and Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
India and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (29 Apr. 1992), Treaties IBFD. 
44. See OECD, Discussion Draft on the Application of Tax Treaties to State-Owned Entities, Including 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (OECD 2009), International Organizations’ Documentation IBFD, also available at 
www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33747_44120057_1_1_1_1,00.html, which had the intention of 
revising the OECD Model: Commentaries in specifically addressing state-owned entities, proposed in 2009 and 
largely adopted in the OECD Model: Commentaries (2010). 
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have much larger current overseas investments. 
 
It is useful to compare the dividend exemption in article 10(3) 
of the 2011 Treaty with an analogous interest exemption in article 
11(3). The 2011 Treaty extends a previous exemption regarding 
interest income “derived by a Government, a political sub-division 
or local authority thereof, and the Central Bank or any agency of 
the Government” to “entities wholly owned by” such government 
persona. Accordingly, a sovereign wealth fund from China is exempt 
from tax on interest received from a UK borrower under the 2011 
Treaty, whereas, under the 1984 Treaty, it might not be.
45
 The 
commercial significance of the revised article 11(3) is, therefore, 
greater than that of the new article 10(3). It can only be hoped 
that whether or not anything is intended by the differences in 
wording between the two exemptions, i.e. how is the concept of the 
“institutions” of a government under article 10(3) to be 
interpreted, and does ownership under article 11(3) encompass 
indirect ownership, will be clarified in the future. 
 
With regard to capital gains, except for a paragraph addressing 
gains from the alienation of ships or aircraft, the 1984 Treaty 
only states that “gains which arise in a Contracting State may be 
taxed by that State in accordance with the provisions of its domestic 
law”. The 1984 Treaty also does not contain an Other Income article 
and, therefore, does not place a limit, with regard to income not 
dealt with elsewhere in the tax treaty, on the domestic law of a 
contracting state with regard to the taxation of income or gains 
arising in that state. The 2011 Treaty reverses this approach and 
gives priority to the residence state to tax residual capital gains 
and other income, which is consistent with the provisions of the 
OECD Model. The revised Capital Gains article reserves to the 
resident state the exclusive taxing right over capital gains from 
the alienation of property other than immovable property, property 
connected to a PE or fixed base, the shares of land-rich companies, 
and the shares of companies of the other contracting state held 
by substantial (25% or more, including both direct and indirect 
holdings) shareholders. This allocation of taxing rights in respect 
of capital gains is not unusual for either China or the United 
Kingdom and it can be expected that the application of the article 
                                                             
45. Even under article 11(3) of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984), “interest ... derived by ... [a] 
resident of that other Contracting State with respect to debt-claims of that resident which are financed...by the 
Government of that other Contracting State ... shall be exempt from tax in the first-mentioned Contracting State”. 
If a debt-claim held by a sovereign wealth fund is financed by (the equity capital of) its government shareholder 
(which it is likely to be), any interest should be exempt. In any case, the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (2011) 
extends this aspect of the interest exemption as well, to debt-claims financed by a wholly-owned entity. 
14 
in China, where, in contrast to the United Kingdom, capital gains 
arising from the alienation of shares by non-residents are taxable, 
will be carried out with familiarity. In contrast, the Other Income 
article (article 21) of the 2011 Treaty adopts an approach that 
is still unusual in the tax treaties that China has concluded, in 
that it gives the resident state exclusive taxing rights for income 
not dealt with elsewhere in a tax treaty, except for income connected 
with a PE in the other contracting state. This addition makes the 
2011 Treaty a particularly favourable one among the tax treaties 




In addition, with regard to the Other Income article, as the 
allocation of exclusive taxing rights over other income to the 
resident state is still an exception to China’s general treaty 
policy, it is unsurprising that the following limitation on such 
an allocation appears in article 21(3) of the 2011 Treaty, the author 
believes, for the first time in the tax treaties concluded by China: 
[PCD single spaced] 
Where, by reason of a special relationship between the 
resident referred to in paragraph 1 and some other person, 
or between both of them and some third person, the amount 
of the income referred to in that paragraph exceeds the 
amount (if any) which would have been agreed upon between 
them in the absence of such a relationship, the provisions 
of this Article shall apply only to the last-mentioned 
amount. In such a case, the excess part of the income shall 
remain taxable according to the laws of each Contracting 
State, due regard being had to the other applicable 
provisions of this Agreement. 
 
Although this language is not uncommon for the tax treaties 
concluded by the United Kingdom,
47
 its interpretation raises 
interesting questions. The provision is modelled on similar 
provisions in articles 11 (Interest) and 12 (Royalties) of the OECD 
Model.
48
 Both the Commentaries on the OECD Model and the 
Commentaries on the UN Model suggest that its recommended adoption 
                                                             
46. Other tax treaties that give the resident state exclusive right to tax (non-PE-related) other income 
include Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (19 
Apr. 2000), Treaties IBFD, Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of Malta for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to 
Taxes on Income (23 Oct. 2010), Treaties IBFD [hereinafter: P.R.C.-Malta Income Tax Treaty] and possibly 
others. 
47. A cursory search suggests that, in addition to the United Kingdom, Japan has also routinely adopted 
this paragraph in the Other Income article of the tax treaties that it has recently negotiated. 
48. See Arts. 11(6) and (12 (4) OECD Model (2010). 
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is motivated by non-traditional financial instruments, i.e. the 
income generated by way of which may, presumably, defy 
classification by the other traditional distributive articles.
49
 
Both the language of the provision and its purported motivation 
imply a particular conception of the type of income included in 
the scope of article 21. According to this concept, such income 
simply has a character that makes the other “distributive rules” 
of a tax treaty, for example, articles 6 to 20 of the OECD Model, 
inapplicable. Nonetheless, such income is similar to interest or 
royalties in that one of the contracting states can be said to be 
the source of the income. The effect of the Other Income article 
is to provide for a zero rate of withholding by the source state. 
Alternatively, the source state may adopt a lowered, negotiated 
rate of withholding.
50
 Along these lines, the source state of the 
“other income” would yield some of its taxing right to the resident 
state only with regard to that portion of the income that conforms 
to arm’s-length standards. 
 
As treaty specialists recognize, however, the Other Income article 
is broader in scope. It covers types of income that fall outside 
the scope of the other distributive rules of a tax treaty not by 
virtue of their character, but by virtue of the lack of a specific 
nexus with a contracting state. In other words, many of the other 
distributive rules of tax treaties are incomplete,
51
 as they 
allocate taxing rights between source and residence states only 
with regard to income with particular characters and particular 
connections with the “source state”. As a result, article 21 is 
necessary to address another type of situation, where an item of 
income arises in a third state, and the intention is to give only 
the resident state, among the two contracting parties to a tax treaty, 
the taxing right.
52
 Examples include rent paid by a resident of a 
contracting state for the use of immovable property situated in 
a third state
53
 and the income from third states of a dual resident 
who is deemed to be a resident of one of the contracting states 
through the application of the treaty tie-breaker rules.
54
 In these 
                                                             
49. See paragraphs 7-10 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010) and paragraph 6 of the UN 
Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011). 
50. Para. 6 UN Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011). 
51. The main exceptions are the rules for business profits and income from employment. Articles 7 and 15 
allocate the taxing rights regarding to these two types of income in all cases, either to the resident state or to the 
PE state or the place where the employment is exercised. Articles 8 and 17 also provide a comprehensive 
allocation and leave no scope for article 21. 
52. See paragraph 1 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010), which states that “[t]he scope 
of the Article is not confined to income arising in a Contracting State; it extends also to income from third 
States”. 
53. Para. 2 UN Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2011). 
54. Para. 1 OECD Model: Commentary on Article 21 (2010). 
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cases, the source state that is not a contracting state in respect 
of the tax treaty in question presumably has its own taxing rights. 
The function of the Other Income article is not for one contracting 
state cede its primary taxing right as the source state to the other 
contracting state as the residence state, but, rather, to limit 





The question that arises is how does the “special relationship” 
limitation on the operation of the Other Income article apply to 
income from third countries? Where a payment is excessive under 
arm’s-length standards, do the two treaty partner states, neither 
of which can claim to be “the source state”, have equal rights to 
tax the income, despite one being the residence state and the other 
not? Take the example of the taxpayer who is a dual resident of 
both State A and State B and who is deemed to be resident in State 
B for purposes of the State A-State B Tax Treaty. Both State A and 
State B would be entitled to subject the taxpayer to residence-based 
taxation on any “excessive other income” derived from third states 
under the “special relationship” limitation in article 21. Is this 
result the appropriate policy outcome? It is not at all clear why 
this should be. Consider another example, where a resident of State 
A rents from a resident of State B property situated in State C. 
Suppose that the rental payment is excessive due to a special 
relationship between the payer and payee and that State A’s domestic 
law considers the source of the rent to be the residence of the 
payer. Here, the adoption of the “special relationship” limitation 
in article 21 means that State A’s source rule effectively applies 
to the “excessive” portion of the rental payment. This may be the 
right policy outcome if the “excessive” portion should be regarded 
as somehow not sourced in State C but “really” sourced in State 
A, for example, the excess is attributable to the special relation 
between payer and payee but not to the underlying business involving 
the property in State C. But whether or not this is the case depends 
on ascertaining further facts. It is not at all clear that an 
automatic limitation on the Other Income article is the best way 
to deal with this situation, especially given that State C may also 
exercise full taxing rights with regard to the “excessive rent”. 
 
In summary, how to appropriately apply the limitation on the general 
rule regarding Other Income in situations involving “special 
relationships”, so that it does not apply in circumstances in which 
                                                             
55. Van Raad, supra n. 23, argues that this function of article 21 is “awkward” and perhaps originally 
unintended. 
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it is not supposed to,
56
 must be resolved by the treaty partners. 
China has not made any pronouncement on this issue and how the UK 
tax authorities apply the “special relationship” limitation to 
cases in which “other income” arises in third states is also unknown. 
 
5. Anti-Avoidance Provisions 
 
The 2011 Treaty adds an anti-avoidance provision to the Dividend, 
Interest, and Royalties articles. This provision is also 
incorporated into the new Other Income article. The formulation 
of the anti-avoidance provision is illustrated by article 10(7): 
 [PCD single spaced] 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was 
the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person 
concerned with the creation or assignment of the shares or 
other rights in respect of which the dividend is paid to 
take advantage of this Article by means of that creation 
or assignment. 
 
Similar provisions have been included in the passive income 
articles in UK tax treaties, going as far back as the Ireland-United 
Kingdom Income Tax Treaty (1976),
57,58
 well before such a provision 
was discussed in paragraph 21.4 of the Commentary on Article 1 of 
the OECD Model (2003).
59,60
 However, this anti-avoidance rule has 
been incorporated only in four of the other tax treaties concluded 
by China, all of which postdate the OECD Commentary on Article 1 
(2003) and were renegotiated tax treaties, i.e. the tax treaties 
with Singapore (2007), Belgium (2009), Finland (2010) and Malta 
(2010).
61
 It is worth reflecting on the significance of this 
                                                             
56. Another issue that should be noted that paragraph [what?] 9 of the OECD Model: Commentary on 
Article 21 (2010) states that “[a]lthough the restriction could apply to any income otherwise subject to Article 21, 
it is not envisaged that in practice it is likely to be applied to payments such as alimony payments or social 
security payments”. It is, however, unclear, how such “understanding” is to be enforced, given that it is 
evidently contrary to the language of the treaty text. 
57. Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Republic of Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (2 June 1976), Treaties IBFD. 
58. In fact, it appears that up to 1994, the rule was largely a creature of UK tax treaties, with Malta adding 
a few more. 
59. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Commentary on Article 1 (28 Jan. 2003), 
Models IBFD. 
60. First in OECD, Restricting the Entitlement to Treaty Benefits (OECD 2002), International 
Organizations’ Documentation IBFD (adopted by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 7 November 2002) 
and then in the OECD, 2002 Update to the Model Tax Convention (OECD 2002) (adopted by the Council of the 
OECD on 28 January 2003). 
61. As, among these tax treaties, the allocation of general taxing rights with respect to Other Income to the 
resident state is only adopted in P.R.C.-Malta Income Tax Treaty, the language has only appeared in the Other 
Income article of that tax treaty. 
18 
disparity, especially given the fact that the United Nations, in 
the Commentary on Article 1 of the UN Model (2011), suggests that 
this particular anti-avoidance rule may be especially appropriate 
for developing countries, i.e. “[taking into] account of their 
ability to administer the various approaches” in countering treaty 
shopping. This is because, for such countries, “it may be difficult 
to apply very detailed rules that require access to substantial 
information about foreign entities”. The “more general approach ... 
proposed in paragraph 21.4 [of the OECD Commentary on Article 1] 




The more detailed anti-avoidance rules discussed in the UN 
Commentary on Article 1 (2011) include “look-through” and 
“subject-to-tax” approaches for dealing with conduit arrangements, 
extensive limitation of benefits clauses and language relating to 
specific foreign preferential regimes.
63
 The implementation of such 
treaty-based rules may require information as to the financial 
operations, ownership and other features of (including legal 
regimes applying to) the treaty benefit claimant. But as long as 
the question of whether or not the grant of treaty benefits is 
appropriate is broached, it appears that government access to 
information should not be a problem if the burden of proof lies 
with the taxpayer. If, on the other hand, the burden of proof is 
assumed to fall on the government, establishing that a main purpose 
of the person “concerned with the creation or assignment of rights” 
was to take advantage of a treaty provision is, in most circumstances, 
not an easy task. The main purpose test is presumably objective, 
thereby requiring a consideration of all of the circumstances. 
 
Perhaps, one way to view the relationship between anti-avoidance 
rules and the “more detailed” rules discussed in the Commentaries 
on the OECD Model and Commentaries on the UN Model is to analogize 
it to the relationship between general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) 
and specific anti-avoidance rules (SAARs). The creation or 
assignment of a right to achieve a tax advantage sounds like “an 
arrangement”. Many GAARs currently used in the world refer to 
artificial arrangements with a main purpose of tax avoidance. The 
Chinese GAAR, for example, is targeted at instances “where an 
enterprise enters into [an] arrangement without reasonable 
commercial purpose and this results in a reduction of taxable gross 
                                                             
62. Para. 57 UN Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2011). 
63. These options are taken from paragraphs 13-21.3 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 
(2010). 
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income or taxable income”.
64
 An “arrangement without a reasonable 
commercial purpose” is defined as one “the primary purpose of which 
is to reduce, avoid or defer tax payments”.
65
 The rule seeking the 
“purpose of creation or assignment” may, therefore, be regarded 
as a GAAR applied to particular types of income. SAARs, in contrast, 
describe the features of specific abusive transactions to limit 
their effect. Very few people would be willing to claim that GAARs 
are easier to administer than SAARs. They may be easier to announce, 
but, due to limitations in information and research resources at 
the legislative or rulemaking stage, tax authorities (from both 
developed and developing countries) may be hesitant to endorse and 
to commit to the enforcement of particular SAARs, and GAARs may 
help to postpone the task of adopting such specific formulations. 
However, when GAARs are implemented, specific criteria must still 
be adopted and applied, and factual investigation regarding the 
particular case is unavoidable. The parsimony of GAARs is manifest 
at the legislative stage, not at the implementation stage. In fact, 
where tax avoidance arrangements tend to resemble one another and 
do not always display unique relevant features, it may be better 
for resource and capacity-restrained tax authorities to adopt 
detailed rules in advance, instead of having to formulate 




Rather than being the easier of the two types of anti-avoidance 
rules to implement, GAARs are commonly understood as a backstop 
for SAARs. When implementing detailed rules is insufficient, tax 
authorities may want to have an additional mechanism by considering 
taxpayer intent. GAARs complement, but do not substitute, SAARs. 
If this is right, contrary to what the Commentaries on the UN Model 
cited earlier in this section implies, it makes perfect sense that 
a developed country like the United Kingdom, which has an 
experienced and resourceful tax administration, would be more 
willing than China to incorporate the “purpose of creation or 
assignment” rule in its tax treaties. In other words, the United 




What does this analysis reveal as to the significance of the use, 
                                                             
64. CN: Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 16 March 2007, 
effective 1 January 2008), art. 47. In such situations, “tax agencies shall have the authority to make adjustments 
using appropriate methods”. 
65. CN: Regulation on the Implementation of the Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the State 
Council, 6 December 2007, effective 1 January 2008), art. 120. 
66. See, generally, L. Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 3, pp. 
557-629 (1992). 
67. It is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this article, as to how the United Kingdom has 
implemented the “purpose of creation or assignment” rule in the past. 
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in four different articles in the 2011 Treaty, of the rule referring 
to “purpose of creation or assignment”? First, with regard to all 
dividends, interest, royalties and other income, the 2011 Treaty 
arguably contains a SAAR of sorts, i.e. the concept of beneficial 
ownership.
68
 China’s SAT has interpreted this concept, in the 
context of all tax treaties, to encompass a rich set of 
requirements,
69
 such that conduit companies can never be beneficial 
owners, and even a set of limitation-of-benefits-like tests must 
be applied. While these interpretations may be controversial, they 
borrow precisely from the “more detailed” rules for countering 
treaty shopping in the Commentaries on the OECD Model and the 
Commentaries on the UN Model. The role of beneficial ownership as 
a SAAR has also been enhanced in the United Kingdom post Indofood 
(2006).
70
 It could, therefore, be expected that “purpose of creation 
or assignment” rule would apply when the beneficial ownership 
determination is believed to be insufficient or generate 
inappropriate results. 
 
Second, insofar as the contracting states have already adopted 
GAARs under their domestic laws, and China has, and the United 
Kingdom is considering the adoption of one,
71
 the “purpose of 
creation or assignment” rule does not add a separate, treaty-based 
anti-avoidance instrument. In this connection, it is notable that 
the 2011 Treaty requires no competent authority consultation in 
the application of the rule.
72
 The effect of the introduction of 
the rule in articles 10 to 12 and 21 may, therefore, be comparable 
to another newly introduced anti-avoidance provision that applies 
to the whole of the 2011 Treaty. This is the new article 23 
(Miscellaneous Rule), which reads as follows: 
 [PCD single spaced] 
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the right of each 
Contracting State to apply its domestic laws and measures 
concerning the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance, 
whether or not described as such, insofar as they do not 
give rise to taxation contrary to this Agreement. 
                                                             
68. It should be noted that the concept of beneficial ownership is not used in the Other Income article in the 
OECD Model and the UN Model. 
69. The basic Chinese rules regarding beneficial ownership under tax treaties are in SAT, Notice on How to 
Interpret and Determine “Beneficial Owners” in Tax Treaties, Guoshuihan [2009] 601 (27 Oct. 2009) and SAT, 
Bulletin Regarding the Determination of “Beneficial Owners” in Tax Treaties, Bulletin No. 30, 2012 (29 June 
2012). 
70. UK: CA, 2 Mar. 2006, Indofood International Finance Limited v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, London 
Branch, [2006] EWCA Civ 158, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
71. See www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/tax_avoidance_gaar.htm. 




The language of article 23, which appears for the first time in 
a UK tax treaty and in China’s tax treaties for only the sixth time,
73
 
arguably only reiterates certain widely agreed principles already 
articulated in the Commentaries on the OECD Model.
74
 The legal 
significance of its incorporation in the text of the tax treaty 
is still unclear. But one possible interpretation is that it 
reflects an understanding between the contracting states that the 
application of various anti-avoidance rules, whether based on the 
tax treaty or domestic law, should be on a mutually acceptable basis 
and that it is when anti-avoidance efforts are pursued this way 
that the contracting state seeking to deny treaty benefits has the 




The importance of the Chinese and UK economies, as well as the volume 
of trade and investment between the two countries, suggest that 
the 1984 Treaty embodies an important treaty relationship for both 
countries. Within this relationship, the countries have 
demonstrated an ability and a willingness to resolve differences 
in understanding, both through the amendment of the tax treaty and 
other informal arrangements.
75
 While the 2011 Treaty still contains 
mostly standardized provisions and few aspects of the tax treaty 
can be said to be truly novel (the inclusion of indirect shareholding 
in calculating ownership percentages for purposes of the reduced 
rate on dividends, now reversed by the Protocol (2013), would have 
been such a novelty), it has clearly been updated to more recent 
treaty norms. The 2011 Treaty, therefore, represents a promising 
framework for the further elaboration of the benefit of UK and 
Chinese taxpayers doing business with one another. 
                                                             
73. With the exception of Arrangement between the Mainland of China and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect 
to Taxes on Income (21 Aug. 2006) Treaties IBFD, all of China’s tax treaties in which the article 23 language 
appears also contain the “purpose of creation or assignment” rule for passive income. 
74. See paragraphs 9.1-9.2 and 22-22.2 of the OECD Model: Commentary on Article 1 (2010). 
75. See the discussion in section 2. with regard to the correction of the reported misunderstanding in 
respect of the P.R.C.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty (1984) regarding technical fees. 
